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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHARLES WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20000543-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for attempted tampering with evidence, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1995); assault against a police 
officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1995); driving 
with any measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6(2) (1998); unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998); possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998); 
driving while license suspended or revoked, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998); illegal parking, an infraction, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-103 (1998). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
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STATEMENT OF THF ISSUES 
1. Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for: 
(a) not opposing an instruction permitting the jury to consider, as an alternative 
lesser included offense of the DUI charge, the offense of driving with any measurable 
controlled substance in the body; 
(b) not moving to suppress the test results of a blood sample taken pursuant to 
a duly executed search warrant; 
(c) not moving to dismiss the charge of assault against a peace officer on 
grounds of self-defense; and 
(d) not seeking a continuance of the trial under Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 
(1999) for the prosecutor's failure to give 30 days notice of her intent to call two 
toxicologists in the State's case against defendant for a misdemeanor DUI? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews as a matter of law an ineffective assistance 
claim raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973,975-76 (Utah App. 
1998); State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). The Court 4"indulge[s] in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) {quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a 
continuance on the day of trial so that he could save enough money to secure private counsel? 
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Standard of Review. The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, f 5,19 P.3d 400, cert denied, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 
2001); accord State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). 
3. Did the cumulative effect of the alleged errors prejudice defendant? 
Standard of Review. A conviction will not be reversed for cumulative error unless 
"'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a 
fair trial was had.'" State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, ffl[ 25, 999 P.2d 7 {quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)(other internal quotations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretation of the following constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant 
to a determination of this case: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1998); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (1998); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.4(1995); and Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999). The relevant language in those 
provisions is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with (1) tampering with evidence, a second 
degree felony; (2) assault against a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor; (3) driving under 
the influence, a class B misdemeanor; (4) unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor; (5) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; (6) 
3 
driving while license suspended or revoked, a class C misdemeanor; and (7) illegal parking, 
an infraction. R. 9-10. The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant. R. 35. 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial as charged. R. 69-70. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the case against him, alleging that his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial had been violated. R. 94-98. After oral argument, the court denied the motion. 
R. 113. 
On the day of trial, defendant requested a continuance so that he could retain his own 
attorney. R. 156. The trial court denied the motion. R. 156. Following the court's ruling, 
defendant left the premises and his attorney could not locate him. R. 156. The court issued 
a warrant for defendant's arrest and proceeded with trial in defendant's absence. R. 156-57, 
236. On count I, charging defendant with tampering with evidence, the jury found defendant 
guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree 
felony. R. 220; Tr.III 435.l On count III, charging defendant with driving under the 
influence, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of driving with any 
measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. R. 225; Tr.III 436. 
The jury found defendant guilty of the remaining five counts as charged. R. 222, 227, 229, 
231, 233; Tr.III 435-36. 
Defendant also failed to appear for sentencing. R. 242. After hearing from counsel 
and defendant's wife, the court sentenced defendant in absentia. R. 242,245-48. The court 
lThe trial transcript, consisting of three volumes, was made part of the record on 
appeal, but was not indexed. The trial transcript ("Tr.") will thus be cited by volume 
followed by the page number, e.g., Tr.I 69, Tr.II 222, Tr.III 418. 
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fined defendant SI,000 and sentenced him to a term of zero-to-five years in prison on the 
felony conviction. R. 246. The court imposed the maximum fines and jail terms for the 
remaining misdemeanor convictions. R. 246-47. The court ordered that the prison and jail 
terms be served concurrently, but consecutively to an outstanding sentence in the state of 
Washington. R. 247. The court also fined defendant $50 for the illegal parking violation. 
R. 247. 
Defendant's appointed trial counsel was subsequently permitted to withdraw and the 
court appointed present appellate counsel. R. 256-57, 260-61, 264. Through his new 
counsel, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 275-76. After filing the notice of 
appeal, defendant filed an untimely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. R. 
286-87, 333, 346-53. No appeal was taken from that denial. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On March 1, 1998, Officer Paul Davis, a conservation officer for the Division of 
Wildlife Resources, was patrolling along the Green River, checking for fishing licenses. 
Tr.II 224, 272, 310, 361. As he did so, he observed a car illegally parked on a boat ramp by 
the river. Tr.II 225. Officer Davis parked his patrol truck to await the owner's return. Tr.II 
225-26. When no one came after several minutes, Officer Davis exited his truck and walked 
downstream in search of the owner. Tr.II 225-26,244. He returned five or ten minutes later 
without success. Tr.II 226. A few minutes later, defendant walked up to his car holding a 
fishing pole, tackle box, and several aluminum cans. See Tr.II 226-27, 275, 283. 
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Officer Davis asked defendant for his fishing license, which defendant produced after 
discarding the cans in a nearby trash can. Tr.II 226-27. Because defendant's driver's license 
number had not been entered on the fishing license, Officer Davis also asked defendant for 
his driver's license. Tr.II 227. On inspection, Officer Davis noticed that the name on 
defendant's driver's license—Charles Wallace—did not match that found on the fishing 
license—Charles Norman. Tr.II 227-28. Defendant explained that "Charles" was his middle 
name and that he had inadvertently omitted his last name. Tr.II 228. After amending the 
fishing license to comport with the information on the driver's license, Officer Davis 
returned the licenses to defendant and directed him to move his car from the boat ramp. Tr.II 
228. Officer Davis then left the area in his patrol truck. Tr.II 228. 
As Officer Davis drove away, he requested a driver's license and warrants check from 
dispatch. Tr.II 228. A couple of minutes later, dispatch reported that defendant's driver's 
license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. 
Tr.II 230. Upon receiving this information, Officer Davis returned to the boat ramp. Tr.II 
232. Defendant had moved his car some 400 to 500 yards up the road, but it remained 
illegally parked. Tr.II 232. Defendant, who appeared again to be collecting cans, met the 
officer at his car. Tr.II 233. Officer Davis explained to defendant that his drivers' license 
had been suspended and that a warrant was outstanding for his arrest. Tr.II 234. Visibly 
upset, defendant explained that he would not have driven had he known his license was 
suspended. Tr.II 234. 
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To help defendant avoid unnecessary towing expenses, Officer Davis offered to let 
him move his car to the parking lot before his arrest. Tr.II 234. However, because defendant 
had become visibly upset, Officer Davis asked for permission to search the car for weapons 
before defendant moved it. Tr.II 234-35. Consenting, defendant handed the keys to Officer 
Davis. Tr.II 235. Looking into the car, Officer Davis observed on the front seat a Diet Coke 
can which had been fashioned into a device to smoke marijuana. Tr.II 235-38. When 
Officer Davis picked up the can, defendant claimed that his son "must have left [it] in there." 
Tr.II 238. Officer Davis then asked defendant if any drugs or other paraphernalia were in 
the car. Tr.II 239. Defendant responded in the negative and invited Officer Davis to look. 
Tr.II 239. 
Upon resuming his search, Officer Davis found a pair of overalls and asked defendant 
if they were his. Tr.II 239. At that point, defendant put a piece of candy in his mouth, "fell 
to the ground and rolled up in a ball, into a fetal position," Tr.II 239-40. When Officer 
Davis asked what was wrong, defendant responded that he had a cold and was not feeling 
well. Tr.II 240. Officer Davis helped defendant to his feet and asked him to lean against the 
car, but defendant insisted on standing. Tr.II 240. After helping defendant up, Officer Davis 
discovered a marijuana pipe containing marijuana in defendant's overalls. Tr.II240-43,358-
59. Becoming even more upset, defendant immediately denied that it belonged to him. Tr.II 
244, 274. 
After finding the marijuana pipe, Officer Davis handcuffed defendant' s hands in front 
of him and placed him in the front seat of his patrol truck. Tr.II 244,277. Officer Davis then 
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put the paraphernalia into a plastic bag in the extended cab portion of his truck. Tr.II 244-46. 
Returning to his search of defendant's car, Officer Davis found yet another piece of drug 
paraphernalia—a glass pipe sitting on the car's center console in plain view. Tr.II 246. 
Again, Officer Davis returned to his patrol truck and placed the glass pipe in the plastic bag 
with the other paraphernalia. Tr.II 253. After again resuming his search, the officer heard 
a can being crushed from the direction of his truck. Tr.II 253. He looked back and saw 
defendant staring at him through the back window while making furtive movements with his 
feet. Tr.II 253. 
After walking back to his truck, Officer Davis saw defendant trying to kick the plastic 
bag of paraphernalia underneath the front seat. Tr.II 253, 279-80, 291. Caught in the act, 
he explained that he just wanted to see what kind of evidence was being planted. Tr.II 254. 
After removing the bag, Officer Davis requested assistance and read defendant his Miranda 
rights. Tr.II 253-55. A forest service officer arrived ten to fifteen minutes later and 
remained with defendant while Officer Davis completed his search of defendant's car. Tr.II 
257. In the meantime, defendant appeared to drift in and out of coherency. Tr.II 258, 362. 
After concluding the search, which revealed no more drugs or paraphernalia, Officer 
Davis requested that dispatch send a drug recognition expert to the scene. Tr.II 257-58. 
About two minutes later, dispatch notified Officer Davis that a drug recognition expert would 
meet him at the jail. Tr.II 258-59. Upon hearing this, defendant remarked that "he couldn't 
believe he was going to jail for smoking one joint." Tr.II 259,286. As Officer Davis began 
to drive away, defendant declared that he was going to die and that the world was going to 
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end. Tr.II 259. Defendant also claimed that he had a third degree black belt in karate. Tr.II 
259. Upon hearing this, Officer Davis decided that defendant should be handcuffed with his 
hands behind his back. Tr.II 259. When Officer Davis stopped to receive assistance from 
the forest service officer, defendant warned of "trouble'' if the officers released him from the 
handcuffs and himself put his handcuffed hands behind his back. Tr.II 259, 261, 365. 
On the 40-minute drive to the jail, defendant exhibited several emotional mood 
swings, leading Officer Davis to believe that defendant was under the influence of a 
controlled substance. Tr.II 262, 337-38, 340. Defendant vacillated from complaints about 
his experience with the legal system, to uncontrollable crying, to yelling and screaming. See 
Tr.II 262-64. For example, he complained about his experience with the Wasatch County 
judge. Tr.II 262. He "sobbed" while talking about his sister. Tr.II 262. He yelled and 
screamed that he was dying of brain cancer and expressed his hope that Officer Davis also 
would die of cancer. Tr.II 262. As they neared the jail, defendant declared his hope to beat 
up a black man in the jail as a "warm up" to beat up others there. Tr.II 262. 
Once at the jail, some two hours after the initial contact with defendant, an officer 
from the Utah Highway Patrol administered three standardized field sobriety tests. Tr.II 263-
64, 341, 344. Defendant remained agitated, exhibiting distinct and cyclical mood swings. 
Tr.II 346. Although the tests revealed impairment, they did not evidence alcohol 
consumption, thereby suggesting that defendant was under the influence of drugs. Tr.II 341 -
44. Defendant was generally uncooperative at the jail, refusing to be fingerprinted or tested 
for drugs. See Tr.II 266, 367-69. Accordingly, Officer Davis secured a search warrant to 
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draw a blood sample and gave a copy of the warrant to defendant. Tr.II 265, 268, 288-89; 
Search Warrant and Affidavit (SW).2 
Notwithstanding the warrant, defendant still refused to cooperate, vowing that "he 
would die before he would give [them] blood." Tr.II 265-66. As Officer Ray Rubles 
attempted to elicit cooperation, defendant became very angry, backed into a corner while 
assuming a "karate posture," threatened to "peck some eyes" out, and feigned a punch at 
Officer Rubles. Tr.II 268, 287, 374-75, 380-81, 386. When two other officers entered the 
cell to assist, defendant punched Officer Rubles in the ear. Tr.II 269, 375-76, 382, 387.3 
Five officers, including Officer Rubles and Officer Davis, immediately put defendant down 
to the floor, and Officer Rubles placed him in handcuffs. Tr.II 269, 290, 369, 382. As 
officers struggled to subdue him, defendant again punched Officer Rubles, but also suffered 
a scrape over his right eye. Tr.II 289-90. After officers placed a "spit hood" over 
defendant's head, a deputy certified to draw blood successfully obtain a blood sample from 
defendant. Tr.II 269-70, 310, 369. The blood later tested positive for amphetamine, 
methamphetamine, and a cocaine metabolite. Tr.II 315-16, 327, 332.4 
2The search warrant, with accompanying affidavits, was made a part of the record 
on appeal, but was not indexed. It is reproduced in Addendum B. 
3Since the incident, Officer Rubles had been to two ear specialists for unresolved 
pain to the ear. See Tr.II 387. 
4In simple terms, a cocaine metabolite is a byproduct of cocaine after it has been 
broken down by the body's natural processes. Tr.II 327-28. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, Defendant claims his attorney failed in 
four instances to provide him with the assistance of counsel guaranteed under the Sixth 
Amendment. However, in each instance, the action defendant argues counsel should have 
taken would not have succeeded. Accordingly, defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails. 
Lesser included instruction. Defendant argues that his counsel should have opposed 
an instruction allowing the jury to consider, as a lesser included offense of the DUI charge, 
driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body (DWM). Because both 
elements of the DWM offense are necessarily included within the first two elements of the 
DUI offense, the instruction was proper. 
Warrant Particularity. Defendant contends that counsel should have moved to 
suppress the toxicology results. He claims that a reference to a urine sample in an attachment 
to the search warrant affidavit rendered the warrant insufficiently particular. The warrant, 
however, simply authorized the seizure of a "blood sample," as did the search warrant 
affidavit. The attachment to the affidavit was included for the sole purpose of describing the 
actions constituting probable cause for the warrant. Reference to a urine sample did not 
create any ambiguity in the warrant. 
Justification for Assault against Officer. Defendant reasons that he was justified in 
assaulting the officer because the blood sample was taken pursuant to an invalid warrant. 
However, because the warrant was in fact valid, the premise of defendant's claim disappears. 
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In any event, because the execution of a search warrant is within the scope of an officer's 
authority, the assault was not justified—even if the warrant were later deemed invalid. 
Notice of Expert Testimony. Finally, defendant argues that his counsel should have 
sought a continuance of the trial because the prosecution did not give notice of its intent to 
call two toxicologists as presumably required under the expert notification statute for felony 
cases. Because the experts were called to testify in the State's case against defendant for the 
misdemeanor DUI charge, the expert notification statute was not applicable. Even if 
applicable, the statute only entitles the defense to a continuance. Although the trial court 
must grant a continuance upon request, counsel is not required to ask for one. After 
considering his options, counsel reasonably concluded that he was prepared to address the 
experts' testimony without a continuance. Defendant has not shown that counsel's decision 
was either deficient or prejudicial. 
II. INQUIRY INTO DEFENDANT'S COMPLAINTS AGAINST COUNSEL. Defendant 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allegedly failed to adequately 
inquire into his complaints against his court-appointed attorney and refused to continue the 
trial to allow him to retain different counsel. Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court 
conducted a reasonable inquiry, but properly found the complaint against counsel to be 
insubstantial. 
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR. Where defendant has shown no error, there can be no 
cumulative error. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 11-30. He argues 
that his counsel performed deficiently for: (a) not opposing an instruction permitting the jury 
to consider, as an alternative lesser included offense of the DUI charge, the offense of 
driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body; (b) not moving to suppress the 
test results of a blood sample taken pursuant to a duly executed search warrant; (c) not 
moving to dismiss the charge of assault against a peace officer on grounds of self-defense; 
and (d) not seeking a continuance of the trial under Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999) for 
the prosecution's failure to give 30 days notice of its intent to call two toxicologists in its 
case against defendant for the misdemeanor DUI offense. 
To prevail on a claim that counsel did not provide effective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must meet the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Under that test, a conviction will not be reversed unless the 
defendant establishes that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064; accord 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
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To satisfy the first prong, defendant "'must identify the acts or omissions' which, 
under the circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1992) {quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). Obviously, "failure of counsel to make motions or 
objections which would be futile if raised [will] not constitute ineffective assistance." State 
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 989 P.2d 52 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Even 
when counsel could have successfully made a motion or raised an objection but did not do 
so, that failure will not be deemed unreasonable if it "might be considered sound trial 
strategy." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (internal quotes omitted). 
To satisfy the second prong, defendant must show "that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. "It is not 
enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome 
of the proceeding." Id. at 693,104 S.Ct. at 2067. Instead, defendant must demonstrate that 
"but for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 42 (Utah 
1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,104 S.Ct. at 2068). A reasonable probability is "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 
Because defendant must establish both prongs, the Court need not "address both 
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 
697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; accord State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993). 
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A. THE OFFENSE OF DRIVING WITH ANY MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
IN THE BODY IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE OF DRIVING UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUG. 
Defendant first contends that counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the 
trial court's instructing the jury that the offense of driving with a measurable controlled 
substance in the body was a lesser included offense of driving under the influence. Aplt. Brf. 
at \2-\5;seeR. 189. Because an objection to that instruction would have failed, defendant's 
claim lacks merit. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, at U 34 (holding that "failure of counsel to make 
motions or objections which would be futile if raised [will] not constitute ineffective 
assistance"). 
The rules of criminal procedure permit the jury to "return a verdict of guilty to the 
offense charged or to any offense necessarily included in the offense charged or an attempt 
to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 21(e) (emphasis added). However, a defendant may not be convicted of both the 
greater (charged) and lesser (included) offenses if the lesser offense is established "by proof 
of the same or less than all the facts" required to establish the greater offense. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1 -402(3). "[W]hen the prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed lesser included 
offense, both the legal elements and the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate 
those elements must necessarily be included within the original charged offense." State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152,156 (Utah 1983); accord State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, f13,993 P.2d 
869 (holding that "a prosecutor may only request instructions on those included offenses 
whose statutory elements are necessarily included within the statutory elements of the 
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charged offense")- In other words, all elements of the lesser offense must be encompassed 
within those of the greater offense. This "necessarily included" standard "protects] the 
defendant from having to defend against an offense not charged." Baker, 671 P.2d at 156. 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). R. 9-10. Because 
there was no evidence of alcohol consumption, defendant was only tried under the drug-
impairment provision of the DUI statute. See R. 185; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) 
(1998). At the prosecutor's request, the jury was also instructed to consider, as an included 
alternative to DUI, the offense of driving with any measurable controlled substance in the 
body(DWM). SeeR. 189-91; Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.6(2) (1998).5 A comparison of the 
statutory elements of these two offenses reveals that the trial court's lesser included DWM 
instruction was proper. 
The essential elements of these two offenses can be summarized as follows: 
Drug-related DUI 
1. "A person may not operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state" 
2. If he "is under the influence of . . . 
any drug" 
3. "[T]o a degree that renders [him] 
incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle." 
DWM 
1. "[A] person may not operate or be in 
actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state" 
2. If he has "any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in [his] body." 
5The DUI and DWM instructions are reproduced in Addendum C. 
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See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44(2)(a) and 41-6-44.6(2) (Supp. 2001).6 Because the DWM 
offense does not require impairment as does the DUI offense (third element), it will be 
deemed a lesser included offense only if both of its elements are necessarily included within 
the first two elements of the DUI offense. 
Defendant does not dispute that the first element of the DWM offense is essentially 
the same as the first element of the DUI offense. See Aplt. Brf. at 14. Defendant points out 
that whereas the DUI offense requires operation or actual physical control of a "vehicle," the 
DWM offense requires operation or actual physical control of a "motor vehicle." That 
difference, however, is inconsequential and defendant does not argue otherwise. See Aplt. 
Brf. at 14. Indeed, because a "motor vehicle" is a kind of "vehicle," any operation of a motor 
vehicle under the DWM offense will also qualify as operation of a vehicle under the DUI 
offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(22), (55) (1998). If a person operates a motor 
vehicle, he is by definition operating a vehicle—which is all that is required for the DUI 
offense. In other words, the first element of the greater offense (DUI) encompasses the first 
element of the lesser offense (DWM). 
The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the second element of the DWM offense 
is encompassed or "necessarily included" within the second element of the DUI offense. 
Whereas the DUI offense requires a showing that the defendant was "under the influence of 
. . . any drug," the DWM offense requires a showing that the defendant had a "measurable 
6Although both statutes have been amended since the date of the offense, the 
provisions under which defendant was tried were not changed. See Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-44(2)(a)(ii) and § 41-44.6(2) (1998). 
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controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in [his] body." Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6(2). Defendant argues that 
because the DUI offense does not refer to a controlled substance or a metabolite of a 
controlled substance, that element is not included within the second element of the DUI 
offense. Aplt. Brf. at 14. Defendant is incorrect. 
Defendant's argument focuses on words, but ignores their meaning. "Controlled 
substances" are a class of drugs. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1998) (classifying five 
schedules of drugs that are controlled). While not all drugs fall within the class of controlled 
substances, all controlled substances are "necessarily included" within that category of 
articles known as drugs. Moreover, because drugs by definition "affect the structure or 
function of man," see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(p) (1998), a driver will be under the 
influence of a controlled substance once its enters the body—whether by inhalation, 
ingestion, or injection. Thus a driver who has a controlled substance or a metabolite of a 
controlled substance in his body (the second element of a DWM), is necessarily under the 
influence of that drug (the second element of a DUI).7 
Moreover, the legislature made explicit what is evident from an examination of the 
elements. Section 76-1-402 provides that an offense is also deemed necessarily included if 
7As explained by the toxicologist, a metabolite is nothing more than the byproduct 
of a drug molecule resulting from the natural breakdown processes in Ihe body. See Tr.II 
327-28. The metabolite itself can also be a drug. Tr.II 328. Thus, even after the drug 
begins to break down in the body, the person is still under its influence. 
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it is ''specifically designated by [the] statute as a lesser included offense." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-l-402(3)(c) (1999). Thus, the legislature wrote section 41-6-44.6 as follows: 
In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44, a person may 
not operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state 
if the person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a 
controlled substance in the person's body. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6(2) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). The statute's preface, ll[i]n 
cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44" thus removes any doubt, if there were 
any, that the DWM offense is not a separate offense, but a lesser included offense of the DUI 
offense. Contrary to defendant's claim, a defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses. 
Although a driver may have had a controlled substance in his body, he cannot be convicted 
of a DWM offense if he was rendered incapable of safely operating the vehicle from 
consuming alcohol, drugs, or a combination of the two. In that case, he can only be 
convicted of the greater DUI offense. The legislature's expression of that fact is consistent 
with the well-settled principle that "one cannot be convicted of both a stated crime and a 
lesser crime that is necessarily included in the proof of the greater." State v. Brooks, 908 
P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1995) {citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)). 
Defendant argues that the DWM offense cannot be a lesser included offense of the 
DUI offense because it "actually increases the scope of proscribed behavior by referring not 
to safe operation of a vehicle but, more simply, bodily evidence of illegal drug use/' Aplt. 
Brf. at 14. Whether or not an offense proscribes more or less conduct is irrelevant to a 
determination of the greater-lesser relationship. Cf Carruth, 1999UT 107,f 13 (reaffirming 
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the test which only defines a lesser included offense as one "whose statutory elements are 
necessarily included within the statutory elements of the charged offense"). 
The proscribed behavior in many other lesser included offenses is broader than their 
respective greater offense. For example, robbery and theft are generally acknowledged to 
occupy the greater-lesser relationship. State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 96,97 (Utah 1983). Yet, theft 
proscribes more conduct than the greater offense of robbery—many thefts occur that do not 
rise to the level of robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1 )(b) (1999) (defining robbery 
as a theft in which the perpetrator "intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force"). Likewise, robbery is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. See State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 657 (Utah 1989) (conviction reduced from aggravated robbery to 
robbery because evidence insufficient to show use of a weapon). As noted, a theft escalates 
to a robbery if the perpetrator uses force or a threat of immediate force during the theft. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1 )(b). However, if the force used "causes serious bodily injury," the 
perpetrator may be convicted of the greater, yet more circumscribed, aggravated robbery 
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(1999). Similarly, when the controlled substance in 
a driver's body "causes" impairment, the driver may be convicted of the greater, yet more 
circumscribed, DUI offense. The fact the DWM offense prohibits a greater range of 
behavior in no way precludes a finding that it is necessarily included in the DUI offense. 
* * * 
Because the DWM offense is a lesser included offense of the DUI offense, the trial 
court properly instructed the jury. As such, defendant's trial counsel did not provide 
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ineffective assistance of counsel in not raising a futile objection to the instruction. See 
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, at % 34.8 
B. THE BLOOD SAMPLE FROM DEFENDANT .WAS TAKEN PURSUANT TO A VALID 
SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant next contends that his counsel was ineffective because he did not move to 
suppress the blood test results which revealed the presence of controlled substances. Aplt. 
Brf. at 16. He argues that had a motion been made, the test results would have been 
suppressed because the search warrant failed to describe with particularity the evidence to 
be seized. Aplt. Brf. at 16. Because any such motion inevitably would have failed, 
defendant's ineffectiveness claim on that ground also lacks merit. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 
at 134. 
"Intrusions into the human body, including the taking of blood, are searches subject 
to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020,1025 
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 969, 121 S.Ct. 406 (2000). As observed by the United 
States Supreme Court, "[s]earch warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, 
and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body 
are concerned;' Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835 (1966). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must be based on probable cause and 
8Because the DWM instruction was properly given, defendant's claim of plain 
error in the second point of his brief also fails. See Aplt. Brf. at 30-31. Where there is no 
error, there can be no plain error. See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 6, 18 P.3d 
1123 (holding that plain error requires a showing in the first instance that "'[a]n error 
exists'") (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). 
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"particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized/' 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
Simply defined, "[a] search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of 
the state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, or 
person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought before 
the magistrate." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1999). The standard for describing the thing 
or place to be searched is well-established. "It is enough if the description is such that the 
officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place [or 
evidence] intended." Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503,45 S.Ct. 414, 416 (1925); 
accord State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 
624 (Utah App.), cert denied, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997). 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the search warrant here was precise and unambiguous. 
The warrant authorized the taking of a "[b]lood sample" from defendant. See Search 
Warrant. It made no reference to a urine sample. See Search Warrant. Moreover, the sworn 
affidavit submitted in support of the warrant also asked for a blood sample. See Affidavit 
in Support of Search Warrant (Affidavit). Nothing, therefore, was left to the discretion of 
the officers in executing the warrant. The officers could readily ascertain and identify the 
evidence to be seized. See Steele, 267 U.S. at 503, 45 S.Ct. at 416. Based on that warrant, 
the officers in fact obtained a blood sample from defendant. Tr.II 269-70, 310, 369. 
Defendant argues that the warrant failed to describe with particularity the evidence 
to be seized because a hand-written attachment to the affidavit asked for a urine sample, 
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rather than a blood sample. Aplt. Brf. at 17-19. However, a common sense reading of the 
affidavit in its entirety reveals that the attachment was not included for the purpose of 
identifying the evidence to be seized, but to recount defendant's actions establishing probable 
cause. See State v. Thunnan, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (holding that a search 
warrant affidavit must be read in its entirety and in a common sense fashion). 
Paragraph 4 of the affidavit asks the affiant to explain why he "believes the subject 
to currently be intoxicated." Affidavit, at f 4. In other words, the affiant must set forth facts 
demonstrating that defendant is impaired or otherwise under the influence. It is here that 
Officer Davis referred to the hand-written attachment. See Affidavit, at f 4. He thus wrote: 
4. Your affiant believes the subject to currently be intoxicated based 
upon the subject's actions. See attached (See attached) 
Affidavit, at f 4 (underscored words hand-written by Officer Davis; strikeout in original). 
Officer Davis thus referred the magistrate to the attachment only for an explanation of those 
"actions" which established probable cause for the drawing of a blood sample.9 That those 
facts also establish probable cause for the taking of a urine sample, as referenced in the 
attachment, does not change the nature or subject of the warrant.10 
9Defendant has not challenged the probable cause finding of the magistrate, nor 
would he be successful in doing so. The affidavit and the hand-written attachment 
established that (1) defendant was the driver of the vehicle; (2) drug paraphernalia was 
found in the car; (3) defendant was combative; and (4) defendant admitted to having 
smoked a joint. See Affidavit and attachment. 
l0Taking a blood sample was really the only viable means of testing defendant 
because it is impractical, if not impossible, to obtain a urine sample from an unwilling 
subject. 
23 
Defendant points out that both the search warrant and sworn affidavit submitted in 
support of the warrant were stock forms designed to obtain a blood sample in cases where 
the subject has refused to submit to a breath test. Aplt. Brf. at 17-18, He suggests that use 
of the stock forms, together with the hand-written attachment, created ambiguity in the 
warrant's description of the evidence to be seized. See Aplt. Brf. at 17-18 (contending that 
the affiant "gives every appearance of attempting to use forms for an altogether different 
purpose, namely obtaining a urine sample from Wallace"). To the contrary, use of the stock 
forms, deliberately altered to conform to the circumstances here, evidence the affiant's 
intention to seek a blood draw rather than a urine sample. For example, because defendant 
submitted to a breath test which revealed no alcohol consumption, see Tr.II 341-42, Officer 
Davis struck the form language indicating that defendant refused an intoxilyzer test, as well 
as the language explaining that blood alcohol dissipates rapidly. See Affidavit, at fflf 5-6. He 
did not, however, strike or otherwise alter the references to the taking of a blood sample. See 
Search Warrant; Affidavit. Had Officer Davis sought a urine sample, it is reasonable to 
conclude he also would have altered the stock forms to reference a urine sample. 
Citing State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1995), defendant alternatively argues 
that the language in the hand-written attachment should actually trump the language in the 
search warrant. Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. Anderson does not support that proposition. 
In Anderson, the search warrant authorized the search of the defendant's residence. 
701 P.2d at 1100. However, the search warrant affidavit only set forth facts demonstrating 
that marijuana plants were being cultivated in a fenced area on the defendant's property north 
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of his house. Id. It did not include any facts suggesting that marijuana or other contraband 
would be found in the home. See id. at 1100, 1103. In executing the warrant, officers 
searched the fenced area, seizing more than 100 marijuana plants. Id. The supreme court 
rejected the defendant's challenge to the warrant on the basis that it did not describe the 
enclosure. The court explained that the affidavit made "clear that the request was specifically 
for a warrant to search the enclosure to the north of [the defendant's] home and only that 
enclosure." Id. at 1102. The court refused to invalidate the search based on a "minor 
technical deficiency]." See id. at 1103. The court concluded that "[bjecause the area 
searched (the enclosure) was the area for which probable cause had been made out, and the 
affidavit adequately defined that area, the search was valid." Id. Anderson, therefore, does 
not suggest that the language in an affidavit trumps language in the warrant. Rather, 
Anderson simply holds that "a law enforcement officer's 'reasonable effort' to determine the 
place to be searched under a warrant may include a review of the supporting affidavit." Id. 
at 1102 {quoting Steele, 267 U.S. at 503, 45 S.Ct at 416). 
Like the warrant, the sworn affidavit here refers to a blood sample. Compare Search 
Warrant with Affidavit. As explained above, although the attachment to the affidavit 
references a urine sample, it was included to identify the facts establishing probable cause 
for the drawing of a blood sample (which incidentally also established probable cause for the 
taking of a urine sample). Under Anderson, this Court will not invalidate the search based 
on a "minor technical deficiencfy]" in the attachment, especially where the evidence seized 
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was the evidence for which "probable cause had been made out, and the affidavit adequately 
identified that [evidence]." 701 P.2d at 1103.11 
* * * 
Because defendant's blood was drawn pursuant to a valid search warrant, any attempt 
by counsel to suppress the toxicology results would have failed. Accordingly, defendant's 
trial counsel did not perform deficiently in not moving to suppress the evidence. See Whittle, 
1999 UT 96, at t 34. 
C. DEFENDANT'S ASSAULT AGAINST THE PEACE OFFICER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. 
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective because he did not move to 
dismiss the charge of assault against a peace officer. Aplt. Brf. at 22. Defendant contends 
he was justified in defending himself against police efforts to draw a blood sample. Aplt. 
Brf. at 22. Defendant concedes that his argument is premised on the assumption that the 
drawing of a blood sample constituted an invalid search and seizure. Aplt. Brf. at 22. As 
discussed above, however, the blood sample from defendant was drawn pursuant to a valid 
warrant. Accordingly, defendant's claim fails. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the warrant was invalid, defendant's claim still fails. 
In State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 573-74 (Utah 1991), the supreme court rejected a 
common law right of self-defense to police conduct. Instead, the court looked to the 
11
 Because the search warrant was valid, the State will not address defendant's 
argument that the search was not justified under the emergency aid doctrine, nor will it 
address the argument that the good faith exception does not apply. See Aplt. Brf. at 19-
21. 
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language of the statute making it unlawful to assault a peace officer. Id. at 574. That statute 
provides: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a 
peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1) (1999).12 Gardiner observed that "[t]he only language in 
this section that could be construed as giving any sanction to a right to resist an unlawful 
arrest is the phrase 'and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his [or her] 
authority as a peace officer.'" Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574 (brackets in original). The high 
court concluded: 
[T]he statute does not require that the State prove that the precise act the 
officer is performing is not legally challengeable, i.e., that the arrest or search 
being effected is entirely lawful and beyond challenge. All that must be shown 
is that the officer is acting within the scope of authority of a peace officer... 
Where the officer is not acting wholly outside the scope of his or her authority, 
the police action may not be resisted. The fine question of legality must be 
determined in subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street. 
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, only if the officer is acting "wholly outside the scope of 
his or her authority" will one be justified in assaulting an officer. Id. In assessing whether 
an officer is acting outside the scope of his or her authority, "the test is whether the officer 
is doing what he or she was employed to do or is 'engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] 
own.'" Id. {quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241,245 (2nd Cir. 1967)) (brackets 
in original). 
l2Although the statute has been amended since the date of the offense to include 
sentencing requirements, not at issue here, the offense itself remains unchanged. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1995). 
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Under that standard, defendant's assault on the officer here was not justified. As 
acknowledged by defendant iirhis brief, Aplt. Brf. at 32, Officer E)avis was acting in the 
performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff. Tr.II 384-85. He had secured a search warrant 
issued by a magistrate. See Tr.II 265-67, 384-85; Search Warrant. Accordingly, even had 
a court later deemed the warrant invalid, defendant was not justified in assaulting the officer. 
Execution of a search warrant issued by a magistrate is wholly within the scope of an 
officer's authority. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1999) (describing a search 
warrant as "an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the state and directed to a peace 
officer"). It cannot be said that an officer executing a search warrant "is 'engaging in a 
personal frolic of his [or her] own.'" Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. (quoting Heliczer, 373 F.2d 
at 245) (brackets in original). Defendant's ineffectiveness claim must therefore fail.13 
Defendant counters that the Gardiner rule should be limited to searches of property. 
Aplt. Brf. at 23. He reasons that the rule should not be applied to compulsory blood tests 
because such intrusions are "constitutionally protected to a higher degree." Aplt. Brf at 23. 
The United States Supreme Court has rejected that view. Indisputably, the "physical 
intrusion [of a blood draw], penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 
Ass % 489 U.S. 602,616,109 S.Ct. 1402,1413 (1989). Likewise, "[t]he ensuing chemical 
analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of [a person's] 
13For these same reasons, defendant's claim in point HI of his brief, Aplt. Brf. at 
31-33,—alleging the evidence was insufficient to establish that Officer Davis was acting 
within the scope of his authority—must also fail. 
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privacy interests." Id. Nevertheless, the nation's highest court has "confirmed 'society's 
judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's 
privacy and bodily integrity.'" Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762, 105 S.Ct. 
1611,1617(1985)). Indeed, "[t]he blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday 
life." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 n.13, 86 S.Ct. at 1836 n.13 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted). The Supreme Court has thus held "that a State could direct that a blood sample be 
withdrawn from a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated, despite his refusal to 
consent to the intrusion" Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625,109 S.Ct. at 1417 (explaining its holding 
in Schmerber). 
Defendant also contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999), justifying the use 
of force against another in defending oneself "against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force," gave him the right to assault the officer. Aplt. Brf. at 24. However, like the other 
justification defenses addressed in Gardiner, section 76-2-402 does not explicitly mention 
peace officers. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 576; compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 & -406 
(1999) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999). This "legislative silence indicates an 
intention that the actions of law enforcement officers taken within the course of their duties 
are not within the category of intrusions that may be lawfully resisted." Gardiner, 814 P.2d 
at576.14 
14Although excessive police force may or may not, depending on the 
circumstances, be within an officer's scope of authority, see Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 575 
(addressing the factual issue of excessive force), 963 (Utah 1996), defendant has not 
briefed the issue. In any event, although defendant suffered a minor scrape above his eye, 
the record does not suggest that excessive force was used. See Tr.II 269, 289-90, 369, 
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* * * 
In summary, because the blood sample was drawn pursuant to a valid search warrant, 
defendant's claim of a nght to self-defense on that ground lacks merit. Even assuming 
arguendo that the warrant was invalid, Gardiner makes clear that any such determination 
made after the fact does not justify the assault. 
D. ANY FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO GIVE NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO CALL 
TWO TOXICOLOGISTS IN ITS CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR A MISDEMEANOR 
DUI DID NOT MANDATE A CONTINUANCE UNDER SECTION 77-17-13. 
The State called as witnesses two toxicologists from the Utah Department of Health: 
Barbara Jeppsen and Susan Rasmussen. See Tr.II 311-32. Their testimony established the 
presence of controlled substances in defendant's body, a necessary element to prove the 
misdemeanor DUI charge and the lesser included DWM offense. Rasmussen confirmed the 
presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine in defendant's blood sample and Jeppsen 
confirmed the presence of benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. Tr.II 315-16,327. Before 
either testified, however, defense counsel raised his concern that the State had failed to give 
the notice required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999). See Tr.II 296-98. He 
acknowledged that he had received their report—apparently at the preliminary hearing more 
than a year earlier. See Tr.II 298. However, he had not received Jeppsen's curriculum vitae 
and only received Rasmussen's curriculum vitae the day before trial. Tr.II 298-99, 303-04. 
The trial court was prepared to grant a continuance, but after further consideration, counsel 
elected to proceed forward. Tr.II 302-04. 
382. 
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On appeal, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective because he did not 
seek a continuance of trial based on the prosecution's failure to give 30-day notice of its 
intent to call two toxicologists in its case against defendant for a DUI misdemeanor. Aplt. 
Brf. at 26. Because section 77-17-13 does not impose a notice requirement in misdemeanor 
cases, defendant's counsel was not ineffective for not insisting on a continuance based on 
the statute. In any event, counsel was not required to ask for a continuance under the statute 
and his decision not to ask for one did not constitute ineffective assistance. Accordingly, 
defendant's final claim of ineffectiveness also fails. 
1. The Expert Notification Statute Does Not Apply to Experts Called in 
the State's Case Against a Defendant for a Misdemeanor Offense. 
Under Utah's expert witness notification statute, a party "intend[ing] to call an expert 
to testify in a felony case at trial . . . shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before t r i a l . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) 
(emphasis added). In this case, defendant was in fact charged with a felony—tampering with 
evidence. R. 9. However, he was also charged with an infraction and five misdemeanors, 
including the DUI misdemeanor charge for which two experts were called to testify. R. 9-10. 
No experts were called in the State's case against defendant for the felony. The threshold 
query, therefore, is whether section 77-17-13 required the prosecutor to give 30 days notice 
of her intent to call an expert in the State's case against defendant for a DUI misdemeanor. 
Defendant remarks in his brief that the statute's application to a case such as this, 
involving both felony and misdemeanor charges, is ambiguous. See Aplt. Brf. at 27-28. 
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However, a fair reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that the statute does not require 
the prosecutor to give the 30-day notice as to experts testifying on misdemeanor charges. As 
noted, the State tried defendant for felony, misdemeanor, and infraction offenses. See R. 9-
10. In such hybrid cases, the State's overall case can no more be characterized as a "felony" 
case, than it can be characterized as a "misdemeanor" or "infraction" case. The statute is 
thus reasonably read to require notice where the prosecutor intends to call an expert in its 
case against a defendant for a felony offense—in other words, in its "felony case." 
Here, the State called the two toxicologists in its case against defendant for the 
misdemeanor DUI offense. No expert witnesses were called to testify in the State's case 
against defendant for the sole felony offense. Accordingly, the State was not required to give 
the 30-day notice under section 77-17-13, and defendant's trial counsel thus did not err in 
choosing not to seek a continuance on that basis. 
2. The Expert Notification Statute Does Not Require the E>efense to Ask 
for a Continuance. 
Even if this Court were to construe section 77-17-13 as requiring the State to provide 
the 30-day notice, defendant's counsel did not perform deficiently by choosing to proceed 
forward with the trial. If the prosecutor does not give timely and proper notice, the expert 
notification statute provides that the defendant "shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial 
. . . sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) 
(emphasis added). This Court has observed that "[t]he statutory language "shall" is not 
advisory; it is mandatory." State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah App. 1998). 
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Therefore, when a defendant moves for a continuance for failure to receive notice, "the 
statute clearly requires the trial court to grant the statutory relief to allow a party to 
adequately prepare." Id. However, that a defendant is entitled to a continuance does not 
mean that he is required to ask for a continuance. Accordingly, it is not enough for defendant 
to demonstrate that counsel was entitled to a continuance. He must show that counsel's 
decision not to ask for a continuance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
3. Counsel's Decision Not to Seek a Continuance Was Not 
Unreasonable and Did Not Otherwise Constitute Ineffective 
Assistance. 
Counsel's performance must be reasonable as measured against prevailing 
professional norms. Id. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2065. As explained, reviewing courts "indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." Id. at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2065. "Counsel is given wide latitude when 
making tactical decisions" and this Court will not find ineffectiveness "unless there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993) 
(internal quotes omitted). Under the circumstances here, it cannot be said that defense 
counsel's performance was unreasonable. 
Although section 77-17-13 was not applicable to the toxicologists here, the trial court 
was prepared to grant any necessary continuance. Tr.II 303. However, after assessing the 
need for a continuance, counsel elected against it, concluding that despite the notice 
deficiencies, he was prepared to address the toxicologists' testimony. Tr.II 303-04. He 
33 
acknowledged that he had their reports and was aware of the results. Tr.II 298,304; see also 
Prelim. 30.15 Although he had not received Jeppsen's curriculum vitae and only received 
Rasmussen's curriculum vitae the day before trial, he had handled numerous cases involving 
toxicologists in the past. See Tr.II 302-04. Moreover, counsel explained that he was 
"actually familiar with Barbara Jeppsen" because she had testified in several of his past 
cases. Tr.II 304. Therefore, because counsel was prepared to address the toxicologists' 
testimony, he was not deficient in choosing not to seek a continuance.16 
Defendant also has not met the second Strickland prong requiring a showing of 
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Defendant claims that he "is not 
required to prove actual prejudice, despite the second part of the Strickland test for 
ineffectiveness." Aplt. Brf. at 29. He argues that "[prejudice is assumed, or perhaps, more 
strictly speaking, [that] the State is obligated to prove that [he] was not prejudiced." Aplt. 
Brf. at 29-30. In support of that proposition, defendant relies on State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913 (Utah 1987), and this Court's decision in Arellano. Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, neither case "liberalized Strickland'' or otherwise gave "appellants greater 
rights than those found in [Strickland]:9 Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. 
l5Nothing in the record suggests, and defendant does not argue, that the reports did 
not comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(2)(b) which outlines the 
necessary contents of the report. In fact, counsel appeared satisfied with the reports. See 
Tr.II 298-99. 
l6It is noteworthy that counsel told the court he needed a week to prepare for the 
proposed drug recognition testimony of the UHP officer. Tr.II 304. The State chose 
instead not to use that officer as an expert. Tr.II 304-05. 
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Unlike the case here, counsel in Knight and Arellano requested a continuance, w hich 
the trial court denied. In Knight, the prosecutor failed to provide the defense with the written 
statements of two key State witnesses in violation of a rule 16 discovery request. 734 P.2d 
at 915-16. Defense counsel did not learn of the statements until after the trial began and 
moved for a continuance. Id. at 916. The trial court denied the defense motion for a 
continuance and allowed the witnesses to testify. Id. In assessing whether the trial court's 
refusal to continue the case prejudiced the defense, the supreme court "place[d] the burden 
on the State to persuade a court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense." Id. at 
921. The court held that "when the defendant can make a credible argument that the 
prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the State to persuade the court that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of the trial would have 
been more favorable for the defendant." Id. 
In Arellano, the prosecutor did not provide the defendant with the notice required 
under the expert notification statute. 964 P.2d at 1168. On the day of trial, defendant filed 
a motion to either continue the trial or exclude the expert's testimony. Id. The trial court 
denied the motion, but this Court reversed. Id. at 1168-69, 1172. In assessing the harm 
suffered by the defendant as a result of the trial court's denial, the Court adopted the 
reasoning in Knight, holding that "the State must persuade the court that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome would have been more 
favorable for defendant." Id. at 1171 (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 921). 
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These cases are inapposite to the case here. Neither involved a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In each case, counsel requested but was denied a continuance. The 
issue, therefore, was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying counsel's request 
for a continuance. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 918; Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1169. Under those 
circumstances, where the trial court's ruling was at issue, the Court saw fit to shift the burden 
of proving prejudice. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 921; Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171. 
Defendant's claim here is of a wholly different order. Defendant does not allege that 
the trial court erred, but that his counsel erred. See Aplt. Brf. at 26. Accordingly, the burden 
of establishing prejudice remains with defendant. As held by the Supreme Court in 
Strickland, it is "the defendant [who] must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Accordingly, where, as here, 
counsel has made a conscious decision not to seek a continuance, it is improper to shift to the 
State the burden of demonstrating that the decision was prejudicial. That remains with 
defendant. See State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989) (declining to create a 
presumption of prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance where counsel did not object 
to closing courtroom during trial even though presumption is recognized in case where trial 
court overrules an objection to closure). 
Defendant has made no showing that counsel's performance prejudiced him. "It is 
not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693,104 S.Ct. at 2067. Yet, defendant offers nothing 
to demonstrate how a continuance would have benefitted him at trial. He has not indicated 
36 
how the experts' qualifications may have been impugned or what another expert may have 
added. This Court will not speculate as to what the testimony of other unknown experts 
might have been. See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996). The record in fact 
demonstrates that counsel effectively addressed the toxicologists' testimony. He cross-
examined Ms. Rasmussen on the methods employed to assure accuracy of the test results, 
obtaining a concession that her results were not independently verified. Tr.II 316-17. He 
raised questions as to the handling of the blood samples at the lab and the number of people 
with access to those samples. Tr.II 318-20. He also elicited testimony from Ms. Jeppsen that 
the cocaine could have been in defendant's body up to three or four days. Tr.II 331. 
Moreover, counsel's efforts to discredit the toxicologists' testimony was apparently 
successful in part. The jury acquitted defendant of the DUI offense, finding him guilty of the 
lesser DWM offense instead. R. 225; Tr.III 436. 
* * * 
Where counsel was not entitled to a continuance under the statute, and he was 
otherwise prepared to address the toxicologists' testimony, he was not ineffective for not 
requesting a continuance. Even if he were under such a duty, defendant has not established 
that he was prejudiced thereby. Accordingly, defendant's final claim of ineffectiveness must 
also fail. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
GRANTING DEFENDANT A CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL TO 
PERMIT HIM ADDITIONAL TIME TO SECURE PRIVATE COUNSEL 
Defendant next claims that the trial court failed to properly inquire into his complaints 
about his attorney and that it abused its discretion in not granting a continuance so that he 
could secure private counsel. See Aplt. Brf. at 33-36. This claim also lacks merit. 
"[W]hen dissatisfaction is expressed, the [trial] court must make some reasonable, 
non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise 
itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her 
appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution or 
even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated 
but for substitution." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987); accord State 
v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 27,984 P.2d 382 (citing Pursifelt). However, a trial court's failure 
to make a reasonable inquiry will not require reversal if the error was harmless. Lovell, 1999 
UT40,atf 27. 
In this case, defendant did not ask that he be appointed a different attorney, but that 
the trial be continued so that he could retain private counsel. See Tr.15-6. Accordingly, this 
Court reviews the trial court's denial of his motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, at % 5, 19 P.3d 400, cert, denied, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 
2001). In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a continuance, the Court looks at 
the following factors: 
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(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior 
to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a continuance could 
have been met if the continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which 
granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the 
opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might have suffered 
harm as a result of the court's denial. 
State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997). Because the motion to continue the 
trial was based on defendant's request to obtain substitute counsel, the denial of the motion 
should also be considered in light of the principles outlined in Pursifell. 
In Pursifell, this Court observed that "motions for substitute counsel are less likely to 
be granted when they would result in a significant delay or mistrial or would otherwise 
impede the prompt administration of justice." 746 P.2d at 273. The Court further observed 
that in considering a defendant's request for substitute counsel, "the [trial] court must balance 
the potential for last minute delay and the propensity for manipulation of the system against 
the competing concern about the likely inability of indigent defendants to articulate and 
communicate their dissatisfaction in a setting which most laypersons find quite intimidating." 
Id. 
A. The Trial Court Adequately Inquired into Defendant's Complaint Against 
Counsel. 
A review of the record here reveals that the trial court made appropriate and 
reasonable inquiry into defendant's complaint against his counsel. On the morning of trial, 
defendant explained that he had "a good job now" and informed the court that he would like 
to retain his own attorney. Tr.I 5. He said he wanted a new attorney because "some of [his] 
rights have been violated." Tr.I 5. He explained that based on a review of the preliminary 
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hearing and the written reports of the officers involved, he believed the charges should be 
dropped for alleged inconsistencies in the officers' stories. Tr.I 5. He wanted an attorney 
that would "state that issue stronger" than the public defender. Tr.I 5. He also complained 
that his attorney did not tell him "that [his] rights weren't violated." Tr.I 5. Finally, he 
claimed that the officers in the jail beat him up and he denied hitting an officer. Tr.I 6. He 
thus requested "a little more time to get [ ] an attorney with the money [he was] getting saved 
up." Tr.I 5-6. 
Following defendant's request, the trial court asked defendant's attorney to respond. 
Counsel explained that he had in fact attempted to explain to defendant his rights, but 
defendant refused to accept counsel's explanations if he did not like what he heard. Tr.I 6. 
He also explained that defendant refused to communicate with him from the beginning. See 
Tr.I 6-7. Although counsel had sent letters to defendant, "he[ ] basically ignored [him]." Tr.I 
6. What communication he did have with defendant was sparse. Defendant spoke with 
counsel some six weeks before the trial. Tr.I 6. He also met with counsel approximately one 
year before trial. Tr.I 7. Counsel believed that defendant became upset with him after he 
made certain recommendations with respect to a plea offer. Tr.I 7. When defendant 
expressed his displeasure at the recommendation, counsel explained to defendant that he was 
free to retain another attorney. Tr.I 7, 14. 
When the trial court asked defendant to respond to his attorney's remarks, defendant 
simply complained about certain alleged representations made by the prosecutor to officials 
in Washington. Tr.I 8. 
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The trial court denied defendant's motion to continue. Tr.I 9. Based on counsel's 
representations and the record before the court, the judge found that defendant was largely 
to blame for problems in communication and delays in the case. Tr.I 10. The court also 
considered the inconvenience to the jury and witnesses. Tr.I 10. However, the court 
emphasized that such consideration was "not driving [the] decision." Tr.I 10. 
Defendant subsequently asked about proceeding without an attorney. Tr.I 11. 
However, after the trial court advised him of the dangers of proceeding without counsel, 
defendant indicated that he did not wish to proceed without an attorney. Tr.I 11 -13. During 
the ensuing recess, defendant left the courthouse. Tr.I 15-16. After waiting approximately 
twenty minutes, the court issued a bench warrant for defendant's arrest and proceeded to trial 
in his absence. Tr.I 16-18. 
The record, therefore, demonstrates that the trial court adequately inquired into 
defendant's complaint. He gave adequate time for defendant to explain his complaint. After 
his counsel responded, the court again gave defendant an opportunity to speak to the issue. 
The court also heard from counsel and made his judgment based not only on counsel's 
remarks, but the record before it. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial 
court failed to make appropriate inquiry. 
Moreover, the grievances raised by defendant were not substantial. He did not 
necessarily claim that counsel was not representing his interests, but only that he believed 
counsel was not representing them strongly enough. See Tr.I 5. His complaint that the 
charges should be dropped prior to trial based on alleged inconsistent statements was 
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untenable under the law. Cf. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, U 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (holding that 
it is "the jury's role to determine the weight and credibility of [the] evidence"); State v. Boyd, 
2001 UT 30, f 14, 25 P.3d 985 (holding that 4"[t]he existence of contradictory evidence or 
of conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict.'"). 
B- The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant's Motion to Continue the Trial. 
Having adequately inquired into defendant's complaint, the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion to continue the trial to allow him to retain private counsel. 
Diligence in Readying Defense. Defendant was not diligent in seeking another 
attorney or in otherwise assisting in the preparation of his defense. His court-appointed 
attorney had advised him nearly a year earlier that he was free to retain private counsel if he 
so chose. Tr.I 7, 14. Yet, defendant did nothing to change counsel. Although counsel sent 
defendant letters, he ignored them. Tr.I 6. Counsel also attributed a lack of communication 
to defendant. Tr.I 7. Defendant did not dispute that claim. See Tr.I 8-9. 
Likelihood Continuance Would Meet Need. Moreover, it is questionable whether 
defendant could or would have secured new counsel if a continuance had been granted. 
Defendant did not identify who substitute counsel would be and he left no real assurance that 
he was then capable of retaining private counsel. Instead, he asked for "a little more time to 
get [] an attorney with the money [he was] getting saved up." Tr.I 5-6 (emphasis added). In 
other words, it was not at all clear that he had sufficient funds to retain new counsel. 
Inconvenience to the Court. A continuance would have also been an inconvenience 
to the court. Witnesses and a jury panel were present. Moreover, defendant exhibited a 
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pattern of failing to appear in court as required, suggesting that he was manipulating the 
system. See, e.g., R. 24 (failing to appear at status hearing; warrant issued), 32 (failing to 
appear at status hearing; alleged car trouble), 105 (failing to appear at status hearing; 
allegedly in a Washington state jail on a 30-month sentence), 113 (failing to appear at a 
motion hearing; reported bad road conditions). While a defendant's right to a fair trial 
outweighs inconvenience to the court, see Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531, the court properly 
considered that factor, though it did not give great weight to it, see Tr.I. 10. 
Harm from Denial Finally, defendant has not shown that he was harmed. Defendant 
received vigorous and able representation at the trial, notwithstanding defendant's absence. 
Defendant contends that counsel's cross-examination of many State witnesses was 
perfunctory or non-existent. Aplt. Brf. at 35. Yet, he neither identifies those witnesses, nor 
explains the deficiencies in counsel's cross examination. Counsel in fact effectively cross-
examined the toxicologists, even obtaining a concession that the controlled substance found 
may have been in the body up to three or four days. Tr.II 316-17. Counsel also successfully 
prevented the prosecutor from having the trooper who administered the field sobriety tests 
qualified as an expert. See Tr.II 304-05. 
Defendant also complains that counsel called no witnesses to testify on his behalf. 
Aplt. Brf. at 35-36. He complains that counsel's closing argument "was entirely derivative 
and not based on any evidence that he himself had put forward at trial." Aplt. Brf. at 36. 
However, the one witness counsel had anticipated calling—defendant—left the courthouse 
never to return, greatly diminishing the ability to present any affirmative defense. See Tr.I 
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209. Moreover, the defense is not required to put on evidence, but may choose to simply 
hold the State to its burden. In closing, counsel stressed the presumption of innocence, 
defendant's right not to testify, and the State's burden of proof. Tr.lII 425-26. He argued 
that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing the offenses of tampering 
with evidence and driving under the influence. Tr.II 426-28. 
In the end, counsel successfully persuaded the jury to acquit defendant of two 
offenses—tampering with evidence and driving under the influence. R. 220,225; Tr.III 435-
36. Defendant was instead convicted of the lesser offenses. R. 220, 225; Tr.III 435-36. 
* * * 
Defendant's conduct and pattern of irresponsible behavior warranted the trial court's 
reluctance to grant a continuance. Defendant's complaints were not substantial and he 
demonstrated a pattern of manipulating the system. See Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 
continue. Moreover, counsel rigorously represented defendant's interests under the difficult 
circumstances of an absent client. Accordingly, defendant's claim on this point must also 
fail. 
III. 
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY 
Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of all claimed errors undermines this 
Court's confidence that he received a fair trial. Aplt. Brf. at 36-37. However, where, as 
here, the defendant "has failed to establish any errors of counsel that prejudiced his right to 
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a fair trial, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 530 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct 431 (1994). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this ffi day of November, 2001. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) (1998) 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as 
shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6(2) (1998) 
In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44, a person may not 
operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if t -1 
person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
RELEV ANT CONSTITbTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, S 76-5-102,4 (1995) 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a 
peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-17-13 (1999) 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the 
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 
30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert' report. 
* * * 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing 
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result 
of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate 
sanctions. 
* * * 
Addendum B 
IN THE ^XUcJZrJ > COURT 
DAGGETT COUNTY, STATS 0? UTAH 
In ret : 
Blood sample from t SEARCH WARRANT 
GMavU* Dallas « 
t Case No: 
COUNTY OF DAGGETT, STATE OP UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day 
before me by p^ul Davis , I am satisfied that there is 
probable cause to believe that on there person of (?lvilr/&6 D/illae.^ 
(DOB^lilSL) in the County of Daggett, State of Utah/ there is 
now certain property or evidence described ast 
1. Blood Sample 
and that said property or evidence consists of an item of/ or 
constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct. 
YOU AR£ THEREFORE COMMANDEDt at anytime day or night to make 
a search of the above-named or described person of 
{VOBZ'lt^i) for the herein-above described property or evidence 
and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me or retain such property in your custody, 
subject to the order of the court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this JJL day of JWAAAL^ . 
199£.. 
dagf o n i iblood . S M 
Judge j&tj/Attis C 
IN THE COURT 
DAGGETT COUNTY, STATE Or' UTAH 
In re: 
Blood Sample frcm 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 01? 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Case No: 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAGGETT COUNTY 
) :ss 
) 
The undersigned affiant, being first Caly sworn, deposes anJ 
says that your affiant has reason to believo-that on the person'of: 
CV^W) k^\\<Me_ DOB Z- IV ^ 
In the County of Daggett, State of Ut;.!;, there is now certain 
property or evidence described as: 
1. Blood sample 
and that said property or evidence conoijt of an item of, or 
constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party Lo 
the illegal conduct. 
This Affiant believes the property and evidence described 
above is evidence of the crime of Driving Under the Influence. 
The facts to establish the grounds i'or issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
1. Your affiant, a S^fo Vg- Peace Officer, first 
observed the subject of this Search Warrant at 11. ()0 a.m. /p.m. 
on / day of (flflrfcM 199^. 
2. At that time the subject was (/OQIK/^J pAil/ ji) h\\ 
3. Upon speaking with the subject, i- rOoflA C\\K- KJ 
4. Your affiant believes the subject to currently be 
intoxicated based upon_ 
5. The subject was placed under arrest foriDriving Under the 
lnfluence\and asked to submit the Intoxily££r, ^^^S^^^ssti^c, 
6. aiood alofchol rapidly diss ipates from tlU blood Myslley, 
ther4fore/this sai^ple must/ be obtained /n the post .expedient nyan/er 
possible. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued 
for the seizure of said items at any tytirevday or/fvigl\t. 
AFFIANT \t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS I<yt day Of 
^T)CL^cJ^ , 1991.. 
Judge 
dagforms:blood.sea 
3 
££_g_o&8WQ.( _^-..-^JI:G.<L S.WKpU 
_ L^aj* -kwisA. l n £QrcjL__6£T_fc^ p^o^^di QM pn[ U 
J^Ow^lTiCkiiO A . o-c^  S^alLoifl- t U Q^k&fyS 
w ^ ' T ' ^ — * ^ j ^ »—— * ^ 
|-0 /.tfLpaifaJ _by • 1 ' I ' JN^ j ^ s -f^  ^ 
Jpajjcsi v ^ o \M yjQrvioU ^ nvV W GUI ^U 
^aCilti (UiMf ^ ^ u U C OoKvL&l • lU ^fr^
 ?|Q 
<xn u ^ o s i ly . r < - V y ^ , U r*> (^vl>. ,>/>_! * O Q O . 
iyq 
gj^f^r cv>^a\\b , . A A 4JT cc\a~ (Jaila_y>, $4nL-kju 
j.v oi.v\-V_ f f t_ y<x.\l&C& Wx...VYU...L.....-k< roaifvc _>jv^n' 
irk) .r\\Tr^4V.t_r_.Q^U.<--.^..i.^f^\ s,__ />a.W...o£ £ « u r j r c w c ! . J V J 
Addendum C 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER r^f 
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, the 
State must prove certain essential facts which the statutes of this 
State define as being necessary elements constituting the crime 
charged. In the case now before the Court, proof of the commission 
of the crime of Driving Under the Influence as charged in the 
Amended Information requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
each of the following: 
1. That the Defendant, Charles Wallace; 
2. On or about March 1, 1998/ 
3. In Daggett County, State of Utah; 
4. Operate or have actual physical control of a vehicle 
within the State of Utah; 
5. While under the influence of any drug to a degree which 
rendered him incapable of safely driving a vehicle. 
The Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the charge 
of Driving Under the Influence contained in the Amended Information 
and thereby denies each and every one of the essential facts as set 
forth above in this Instruction. Defendant's plea of not guilty 
thus casts upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and all of those essential facts. Therefore, if you 
find from the evidence received during the trial that the State has 
proven each and every one of these essential facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt it would be your duty to find the Defendant 
guilty. On the other hand, if you find by the evidence received 
during the trial that the State has failed to prove any one of 
those essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be your 
duty to find the Defendant not guilty, 
Cd)a:dag21vWallace.]3b 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER // 
The law permits you to find the defendant, Charles Wallace, 
guilty of any lesser offense which is necessarily included in the 
crime charged in the Amended Information whenever such a course is 
consistent with the facts found by you from the evidence in the 
case and with the law as stated by the Court-
Therefore, you may consider whether the Defendant is guilty of 
any lesser offense if the evidence is sufficient to establish his 
guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The offense of Driving Under the Influence with which the 
Defendant is charged necessarily includes the lesser offense of 
Driving With Any Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body. 
(Cd) a : d a g 2 2 W a 11 ace. i l l 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER ^ 
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, the 
State must prove certain essential facts which the statutes of this 
State define as being necessary elements constituting the crime 
charged. In the case now before the Court, proof of the commission 
of the crime of Driving With Any Measurable Controlled Substance in 
the Body requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the 
following: 
1. That the Defendant, Charles Wallace; 
2. On or about March 1, 1998; 
3. In Daggett County, State of Utah; 
4. Operate or have actual physical control of a vehicle 
within the State of Utah; 
5. With any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of 
a controlled substance in his body. 
The Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the charge 
of Driving With Any Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body 
and thereby denies each and every one of the essential facts as set 
forth above in this Instruction. Defendant's plea of not guilty 
thus casts upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and all of those essential facts. Therefore, if you 
find from the evidence received during the trial that the State has 
proven each and every one of these essential facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt it would be your duty to find the Defendant 
guilty. On the other hand, if you find by the evidence received 
during the trial that the State has failed to prove any one of 
those essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be your 
duty to find the Defendant not guilty. 
(Cd)a:dag22\Wallace.llO 
